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Il Massacro di Wia - The Wia Massacre


Massacre Wia
Italino version of NT

Another reprehensible mass killing was the massacre of WIA. The 2006 report of the Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" reports that 'June 10 [2005] military personnel killed 161 young people, who tried to flee the Wia military camp'. No action was taken against military personnel who shot and killed 161 young people. The victims were enrolled in the NMSP (National Military Service Programme), ended up in prison in detention for several reasons.
The massacre was intended to terrorize others, lest you decide to leave the country 'illegally' or not abscond once ended up in detention. The military camp of WIA was the same place where, in 2001, about 2,000 college students were arbitrarily detained for several weeks after having protested against the summer job, an unpopular government policy. During detention, two university students, and Yemen Yirga Yosief Tekie, have died because of harsh living conditions in the field.

The Massacre Wia

by Daniel
reprehensible Another mass killing Wia Was The Massacre. Quoting the US Department of State, in its 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices reported that ‘on June 10 [2005] military personnel shot and killed 161 youths at Wia Military Camp who were trying to escape.’ No action was taken against military personnel who shot and killed the 161 youths. The victims were conscripts of the NMSP (National Military Service Programme), who were being kept in the detention camp for several reasons.
The massacre was meant to terrorise other conscripts, lest they decide to leave the country ‘illegally’ or escape once they were in detention. Wia Military Camp was the same place where, in 2001, some 2000 university students were arbitrarily detained for several weeks after protesting against the unpopular government policy of summer work. During the detention, two university students, and Yemane Tekie Yirga Yosief, died as a result of the harsh living conditions in the camp.

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Il Massacro di Mai Habar - The Mai Habar Massacre

Massacre Mai Habar
Italino version of NT
The main cause of repression in Eritrea is the excessive concentration of power within the executive branch of government. The brutal suppression of the revolt of disabled veterans of war was one of the first demonstrations of this sad development: event that happened back in July 11, 1994, known as the Mai Habar Massacre. In this episode, an unknown number of protesters were killed, allegedly on the direct order of President of the State. During the second anniversary of the massacre Mai Habar, the official bulletin of EFL-RC (Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council) complained that on that fateful day, war invalids were killed only for peacefully protesting and then asked firmly a meeting with the President of the State, which stubbornly refused to meet them.

Other victims associated with the massacre Mai Habar are about 25 disabled war veterans, who were immediately arrested under the pretext of inciting to rebellion. Remained detention without trial for several years. The same source cited the words of the president, referring to invalids of war says ' spoiled brats'. The president attributed the cause of the accident alleged irresponsible acts of the protesters themselves.


The Massacre Mai Habar
by Daniel
Concentration of excessive power within the executive branch of government has Been the major causes of repression in Eritrea. One of the Earliest Manifestations of this sad development Was the brutal repression of the mutiny of disabled war veterans on 11 July 1994 , Known as the Mai Habar Massacre. In this incident, an unknown number of protestors were shot dead, allegedly on direct orders from the state president. During the second anniversary of the Mai Habar Massacre , the official newsletter of the EFL-RC (Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council) lamented that on that fateful day the disabled war veterans were killed simply for peacefully protesting and firmly demanding to meet the state president, who obstinately refused to meet them.

Other victims associated with the Mai Habar Massacre are some 25 disabled war veterans , who were immediately arrested on the pretext of instigating rebellion. They remained in detention without trial for several years. The same source has quoted the state president as referring to the disabled war veterans as ‘ spoilt brats .’ The president has also blamed the incident on alleged irresponsible acts of the protestors themselves.

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Yemen summons Eritrean ambassador for alleged arms supply to rebels

www.chinaview.cn 2009-11-10
Y emeni Foreign Minister Tuesday summoned Eritrean ambassador to Yemen following alleged tips that Eritrea provides weapons to anti-government rebels in Yemen, a diplomat at the Yemeni Foreign Ministry said.

"The Ministry got evidence and valuable information that Eritrea facilitates conveying weapons through its coastlines -- provided from a foreign country -- to the Zaidi rebels in northern Yemen," the diplomat told Xinhua by phone on condition of anonymity.

He said coastguards of Yemen often intercepted boats full of concealed weapons sailing from an Eritrean coastal city to Medi port adjacent to bastions of Zaidi rebels, named Houthis after their slain leader's clan.

"Rebels go to Eritrea as Yemeni fishermen in disguise to avoid being intercepted by the Yemeni coast guards, and come back with their boat full of concealed weapons," said the diplomat, adding "at night they docked at Medi and unloaded the weapons to vehicles awaited at some specific places."

The diplomat hinted at the possibility of using Eritrean soil as a base by Iran, but providing no further details.

Sanaa has often said that Iran is backing Shiite rebels in Yemen, an accusation which Iran has always denied.

Eritrea is situated in the Horn of Africa, off Yemeni northern coastline and Saudi city of Jizan on the Red Sea, where high-level skirmishes between Yemeni rebels and Saudi military forces have erupted after anti-government rebels crossed into the Saudi soil of Jizan.

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Gulag degli studenti eritrei

by N.T. 30 settembre 2009

Era la metà del mese di luglio e il mondo aspettava il summit del G8 a genova. Televisioni sintonizzate sulla riunione dei governanti dei maggiori paesi industrializzati. I No-Global manifestano insieme alle associazioni pacifist. Police, Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza in riot gear. Army on alert. The tessione begins to mount, the information also gives voice to the protesters. The news do not talk about anything else. Urban warfare, Black Block, scuffles and positions of the agents. All seem to lose all sense of reality. The world is appalled before the killing of Carlo Giuliani, are shown the video of that unfortunate incident. The beating of demonstrators avviente after the Diaz school and in the streets, is transmitted as a prolonged pain. Stop the events that follow one another in the West and turn our attention to Eritrea.

In those days even in those times there were ongoing demonstrations Asmara University students. Why Eritrean students were protesting? Because these disagreements to their government in an African country? E 'are known to students around the world during the summer holidays are less committed because of the holidays. In Eritrea, however during the summer each student at any level required to participate in the work (called in the Tigrinya MAATOT) promoted by the dictatorship. There's even a summer program for political proselytizing of young western Eritrean origin. Here is an example program in 2008; 2 days of special celebration dedicated to the youth of Canada and the United States: [ http://na.nueys.org/flyer/Guideline% 20for% 20Participation.pdf ]
Virtually
colonies of boys are sent to work in villages (and villages) located in remote areas. In almost 18 years of administrative management of the scheme Afewerky, almost every summer, with a few exceptions, all students were forced to hard labor in the Gulag Eritreans. Child labor exploitation, violation of freedom of movement and freedom, forced labor, slavery, physical punishment, etc. ... etc. ... The violations will not count.
course, the representatives of the university after years of silence patient manifested on behalf of all students, protested against this practice of exploitation, in opposition to the regime firmly. They had never done, on that occasion The repression was brutal. From that moment on, the history of the Eritrean government is moving towards a point of no return full of horrors.

You can ask around, and Western diplomats to authorities, the event of university students, then branded as a coup attempt against the government. According to this charge students were deported to detention camps military. A witness describes in detail what has happened in that time university students to asmara [ http://www.awate.com/portal/content/view/4025/6/ ]

This history of repression mass ends for many university students November 7, 2001 after months of torture and agonies, with at least two deaths among students (Yirga Yosief and Yemane Tekie -14 August 2001 - August 19, 2001). The atrocities have been consumed in various prison camps, of which only the military has Wia convolto 2000 students arbitrarily detained. The dismantling and destruction of university education was only beginning. Here's a post reflection on why the closure of the University of Asmara:
[ http://admasinexile.blogspot.com/2008/03/why-demolishing-sole-university-in.html ]

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Scambio epistolare con un giornalista

by NT September 30, 2009

L a bad story of the children of Petros Solomon is important to us, as we are care about the Eritrean civilians who have no voice to cry out their pain.
[ http://www.awate.com/portal/content/view/5233/3/ ]
[ http://www.awate.com/portal/content/view/5216/3/ ]
[ http://espresso.repubblica.it/dettaglio/desaparecidos-d-africa/2111093 ]

When I informed many of my fellow students for the disappearance of Asmara (capture) of the children, some have suggested that I not to endanger the flight of children of Petros, others have asked me if I was some opposition to the game and kept asking me why I was interested in these guys.

Despite myself, the bad news I have had during the period of maturity exam will take place in Italy that coincides with that of Italian schools abroad. The children of Petros had disappeared the day before the start of the examination and no one could identify where they were finished. Not even phone calls to her aunt, who lived with the boys, were able to resolve the issue.

Probably the reputation of the parents of these children and the failure to present the final exam, which could not be put off, disturbed professors and students. There was (still is) a suspicion that members of their Eritreans have organized the kidnapping and then fabricated the story of the escape. The suspicion arises, because the boys were quite good to merit scholarships abroad. In two years they could conclude the duties of citizens and Eritreans could hope to leave the country to study abroad.

I personally feel involved in this story only because they followed the footprints where I passed. They attended the same school and even the same teachers. Then the comments of some, who wondered why the continue to tell only the story of the children of Petros, may be of questionable validity.

I thought that perhaps we need to "inform" the public is Italian and the Italo-Eritrean different attrocità Iseyas Afewerky made by the scheme. Indeed instead of the term "information" would use "remind" poichè molti sono a conoscienza dei fatti e ma hanno la memoria corta.

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MILITARIZED Diplomacy: foreign policy ERITREA between continuity and discontinuity (Last Part)

Considerazioni Conclusive

Volendo mettere in luce alcuni elementi caratterizzanti la politica estera eritrea, una premessa è d’obbligo. Infatti, le posizioni prese dal paese in diplomazia non possono che rispecchiare la necessità di preservare e di rafforzare la propria identità di nuovo attore della comunità internazionale e regionale. Il concetto di sovranità nel Corno d’Africa è, storicamente, un valore molto sentito, e sulla cui base sono state spesso combattute guerre drammaticamente sanguinarie (come quella dell’Ogaden del 1977-78 tra Etiopia e Somalia e quella of the 1998-2000 border between Eritrea and Ethiopia). In addition, one of the effects of the last war of 1998-2000 is certainly represented by the redefinition of membership of "national" of both contenders. The thirty years' war of national liberation dell'EPLF, in fact, were largely perceived as something "inside" Ethiopia. The latest conflict, however, it is a war between two sovereign countries, seems to have had a successful round. In this case, it is Eritrea "other" against which (and why) the Ethiopian national identity was (re) defined. This observation seems rather true when one considers that, following the victory of 2000, the Ethiopian Government has never tried to absorb Eritrea, or to territorial claims, with the exception of one area that was the cause of the conflict. A valid method, then, to understand the positions - sometimes unscrupulous - the Eritrean government's foreign policy is to set a reflection on a longue durée approach, identifying more than other elements of continuity that characterized the international relations Eritreans, by struggle for national liberation to the country's entry into the international community. Dell'EPLF military victory against the Ethiopian army, as we have seen, it certainly served - as well as to shape and reinforce a sense of Eritrean national unity - as a factor in the radicalization of foreign policy.

The efficient military organization experienced during the years of guerrilla antietiopica was almost entirely transferred to the frameworks and governance structures of post-independence period, thus also the militarization of the state administrative structure. Historically, problems with the sovereignty of the country (from the deposition of the federal structure by Haile Selassie in 1963, the long liberation war which ended only in 1991, up to last cross-border conflict with Ethiopia's 1998-2000), have ended up shaping diplomacy "traditionally aggressive, both in language, both in bilateral and multilateral regional relations.

Eritrea, moreover, is also a "State border". This concept, the role and the geographical and political position of the country, has always been characterized by a certain ambivalence. In other words, it seems to be necessary both in the physical sense (Eritrea has among its neighbors really important state actors such as Ethiopia and Sudan, but it is also located in a strategic Red Sea, making it a ring of meeting with the mainland Arabic) sia in senso ideologico (il popolo eritreo ha vissuto per anni in opposizione alla dominazione di un “centro” rappresentato dalla realtà imperiale etiopica, e ancora oggi la propaganda del governo di Asmara sembra essere tutta indirizzata a enfatizzare una possibile minaccia esterna e a preservare i confini raggiunti durante gli anni di lotta di liberazione).

Per riassumere, quindi, “frontiera” e “militarizzazione” sembrano essere i punti cardinali di una politica estera, quella di Asmara, impostata quasi su una conservazione ossessiva della propria identità di stato indipendente. Ogni eritreo, infatti, vive costantemente in uno stato di allerta e immerso in una propaganda che enfatizza il imminent danger of invasion. It is also why, historically, the Eritrean foreign policy can be described almost as a Militarized diplomacy. In addition, although difficult to envisage redevelopment in the short term - primarily due to continued disagreements with Ethiopia - it is clear that only a "demilitarization" and "demobilization", not only of military equipment, but also of the same foreign policy of the country , finally I can include the risks of a new escalation of violence in the Horn of Africa. It is true that the two challenges go hand in hand, and that in the absence of a reduction of the soul that distinguishes today's militarist government Afwerki, will be difficult to have the same effect in foreign policy.

The border war of 1998-2000 and the demarcation of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border are still an open wound in complex regional chessboard. But the international community's response does not appear to have been adapted to the prerogatives of the complicated state of relations between the two contenders, causing the one hand the emergence of regional hegemonic ambitions, while the other - in addition to a strong sense of distrust of actors International mediation - a dangerous radicalization in foreign policy is domestic. The failure of the boundary - and therefore also of the Algiers Agreements - Is mainly in the fact that he left to "politicize" an issue deliberately kept - at least initially - in a sphere purely "technocratic". The Algiers Agreements in fact (in the proposal made by the U.S. and Rwanda) have been conducted primarily within a sphere technique, leaving largely unanswered the substantive policy issues. These are summarized in at least three points: 1) The principle of conservation of colonial borders in sub-Saharan Africa as set out by the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) during the Cairo Summit of 1964. The Boundary Commission - in order not to derogate from that principle - could not act ex aequo et bono, according only to treaties concluded during the colonial period between Italy and Ethiopia. 2) Ethiopia has won the last military confrontation of 1998-2000. It therefore seems clear that the prospect of passing the village of Badme to Eritrea in the country has triggered some alarm bells, and the fear of a "mutilated victory" achieved with enormous human and economic disputes. 3) The Eritrea, from its side, was certainly the moral winner, as well as military, the war of national liberation, achieved through enormous sacrifices, and in almost complete international isolation. A clash between two winners then? Perhaps, but the problem does not seem be the border itself.

addition, the tools used to contain a new escalation of the conflict have ended up producing the opposite effect. Given these complications, international - and especially regional - you can certainly see how the language used in diplomacy by both countries - although both oriented toward the head-on collision - are profoundly different and temperamentally. While the Zenawi government is more willing to diplomacy and less militaristic (do not forget that Ethiopia has rejected the first decisions of the Boundary Commission, as well as militarily invading Somalia, citing as main motivation the need to destroy the jihadist movements in the country and supported, according to Addis Ababa, Eritrea), Afwerki seems at least to most harsh and unscrupulous. This feature is likely to slide Eritrea in complete international isolation. In fact, there are a few to consider in Asmara as a major source of instability in the Horn of Africa, to become - according to the U.S. government - a real "rogue state", almost like Iran and Korea North.

It is true that a less "global" and more "regional" by the international community - Washington in testa – avrebbe certamente evitato una tale degenerazione politica. Ma del resto è anche piuttosto risaputo che – con una brevissima eccezione durante l’ultimo periodo di amministrazione Carter – il Corno d’Africa è stato sempre inserito all’interno di ampie strategie geopolitiche, che poco o nulla avevano a che fare con dinamiche e priorità politiche più locali, facendone al contempo una delle aree più contese dell’Africa sub-sahariana, ma anche una delle meno “comprese”.

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Albania: the gag Information

by Lady Eagle in collaborazione con Michele. 5/11/2009

Sono passati ormai quasi vent'anni dalla caduta of the Berlin Wall and especially cadauto Communist regime in Albania . The wind of change has brought with it suffering, social inequality and consequently exodus of generations. Fathers and sons ingiottiti from the sea and storm, cold and heat consumed by the hope for a better future. Generations lost in the struggle for survival on the sea bed and never returned to his family.
discriminated against because recent emigrants from Albania and in the social scale, segregated and deprived of any right, upon their arrival deprived of their freedom of movement, persecuted for their religious beliefs and political thought. All violations in a land they thought best and civil. In a West where he professes freedom of the press, communication, movement, thought, expression and belief, immigrants are denied their basic rights and often subjected to smear campaigns by their own free press.
decades now 89, but the beautiful land of the Eagles went from Communist Regime a Democratic Regime , by the dictator Enver Hoxha, the dictator Sali Berisha .
Twenty years is a reasonable time for a change, but my land is still in the hands of organs " authoritarian political" and "gag information. Where the rich lord it and others suffer without a murmur. Because the speaker farà i conti con chi comanda.
A chi viola il "silenzio stampa" imposto de facto , come ha fatto una testata giornalistica di opposizione con ironia e con prove tangibili, viene applicata una sanzioni che prevede anche il divieto di pubblicazione.
Divieto di pubblicazione per 296 giorni solo per aver criticato il governo albanese, come nei peggiori regimi totalitari. Chi, se non la stampa locale deve verificare l'operato dei governanti. I capi del governo e gli amministratori stanno al vertice del paese non per comandare ma per governare . Probabilmente molti dittatori conoscono affondo la sottile differenza semantica tra governo e comando.
Mero Base, editore e fondatore del giornale banned from publication, driven by professional duty to the freedom of the press, continues with determination to recount in detail his truths informing illegally especially via the web. The publisher

Mero Base has now become a journalist who opposes the policy of Sali Berisha. The Prime Minister Berisha is a powerful man who is now at the top by a vettennio. Prime Minister from 1992 to 1997, in opposition from 1997 to 2005, became prime minister in 2005 for the second time. In the disputed election of 2009 was and continues to vicitore shall exercise its power on Albania. It 's a controversial figure in September 1998 in Tirana took part in the attempted coup against The Nano government after the murder of Azem Hajdari Democrat. But an authoritarian character
not enough to have the power of government, also wants to control the thoughts of citizens, and then click the persecution of all forms of differentiation. It professes the concept that says: "One heart, one nation." Those who have a different view from those in power are enemies of the country.
And here punctually arriving aggression towards the hands of publisher Mero Base Rezart Hush made just to intimidate. The absurd and that the hitter is respectable Rezart Taci Taci Oil President, Chairman of Klubi Sportiv Gramozi Ersek (Albanian football club), chairman of the chess league Albanian. An Albanian so rich tycoon who had the ball to buy Bologna football. Have you understood the Bologna FC 1909 , which plays in Serie A Italian. L ' 80% of the shares of Bologna's patron Rezart Shut up. The Taci Oil is a company operating in the extraction oil.
In an authoritarian state only those who have protective shadow of the dictator can be enriched at the expense of citizens. The owner Rezart Hush trusted friend of Prime Minister Sali Berisha beaten to a pulp with impunity the publisher Mero Base.
Sali Berisha preliminary PUBLICATION parole di condanna contro il gesto di aggressione ma in modo celato vigila sui propri interessi e persegue ogni forma di libertà di stampa ed espressione. In questi giorni un gruppo di giornalisti e attivisti della società civile hanno manifestato davanti all'ufficio del primo ministro per contestare la mancata azione concreta del governo albanese. Ricordo per la cronaca che l'editore Mesa Base fu brutalmente assalito al Bar Capriccio , nel centro di Tirana , quartiere Bllok . L' aggressione selvaggia da parte di Rezart Taçi e delle sue guardie del corpo è durata vari minuto interrotta forse dalla perdità di conoscenza dell'editore. There is nothing in this human wickedness there is nothing in this Albanian aggression. The country of Albania Maria Teresa is a country of love and acceptance, it must not be prey to unscrupulous businessmen.
proud to be born in the land of the Eagles, proud of the blood of a proud people, always fighting say NO to this government without dignity and without respect, I say NO to one of the dictators who are still standing, I say NO to countries before the atrocity and ask dumb voice for a people who have the right to speak, to work and live without fear.

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Militarized Diplomacy: foreign policy ERITREA between continuity and discontinuity (Part III)

regional report

To assess the post-independence Eritrean regional reports is good to analyze links, as well as Ethiopia, also with Sudan, especially after the mid-nineties.
For then, relations between the two countries seemed to be quite tight, especially for the support of the Khartoum government provided some jihadi groups, and Eritreans - later - because of summit of Sana'a, which took place between the leaders of Ethiopia, Yemen and Sudan, which is soon to be configured as a true "diplomatic front" containment antieritreo. The meeting in Arabic, in fact, occurred in 2002 between Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, indeed a closed system of alliances (only the appearance of economic origin) in many ways hostile to Asmara, which, in turn, had contributed least to encourage. This diplomatic encirclement, in fact, the result was certainly one part of the continued war against Eritrea in Yemen for the Hanish archipelago (not completed until 1998) and the other of supporting Sudanese rebel Eastern Front, in the border region of Kassala, and the government in Khartoum had always responded with the support of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (pointed to by the apparatus of government in Asmara which more responsible for the attacks in the towns of Barentu and Tesseney May 2004).

The scenario just described has, however, suffered - particularly in the last two years - a very significant change. This was mainly the product of a reversal of Isaias on relations with Sudan and Yemen. The agreement in Asmara on 14 October 2006, which ended the armed conflict between the rebels of the Eastern Front and the Sudan government in Khartoum, was - in the complex arena of regional Horn of Africa - an undeniable victory Afwerki for diplomacy. The words of appreciation from his counterpart costs Al-Bashir at the last summit of COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) held in Djibouti, "the impeccable mediating role played by negotiations in Asmara and - specifically - to the availability of its president to have contributed actively to the achievement of meetings ", have helped to capitalize on the final exit from the isolation of Eritrea.
Consequently, the "Front of Sana'a" has undergone a significant downsizing, the new course the Eritrean-Sudanese relations have undoubtedly helped to accelerate.

is undeniable, however, as other factors have indirect militated in favor of Asmara. The current cooling of relations between Addis Ababa and Djibouti, for example, due to the choice of Zenawi to do the port of Djibouti is the only landlocked country - involving them working relationships for the usufruct of Port Sudan - not that a major reversal of this indirect diplomacy. The Minister of Transport and Communications of Ethiopia has recently announced it will join Port Sudan to the Ethiopian town of Moyale through a railway line in order to seriously consider the partial replacement of Djibouti (for the exponential increase in costs required Arab society by management of the port) as a preferred channel outlet on the Red Sea.
Expulsion of Djibouti from Ethiopia, Eritrea and its subsequent approach has also paved the way for dialogue with other countries in the Red Sea, as evidenced by improved relations with Yemen. In December 2004 Afwerki made the first official visit to Sana'a. The changed relationship between the two countries began with the resolution of the International Court in The Hague, following the invasion of the Hanish Islands (located at the mouth of the Red Sea) by Eritrea in 1995. The ruling gave the largest island of the archipelago (Hanish, in fact) to Yemen, while the smaller islands are divided between the contenders, evitando nuovi contrasti in merito allo sfruttamento delle risorse ittiche. Ulteriore testimonianza del rinnovato spirito di cooperazione risulta essere lo scambio di visite dell’estate del 2006 tra il presidente Isaias e la sua controparte yemenita Ali Abdullah Saleh. Durante i colloqui i due leader hanno avuto l’occasione di discutere di molti aspetti legati alle relazioni bilaterali tra i due paesi, rafforzando le prospettive di una futura cooperazione anche in campo economico.

Il riavvicinamento politico di Asmara verso vicini importanti quali Sudan e Yemen non appare pertanto essere casuale. Inoltre, la giustificazione antietiopica – almeno in questo caso – potrebbe non risultare sufficiente per coglierne totalmente le motivazioni. Non è un mistero, infatti, che Khartoum e Sana’a, oltre a rappresentare due vicini geopoliticamente importanti, sono altresì due paesi produttori di petrolio. Il Sudan soprattutto – grazie anche alla relativa stabilizzazione raggiunta nelle regioni del sud con la firma del CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) del gennaio del 2005 – rappresenta il terzo maggior produttore di petrolio dell’Africa sub-sahariana, alle spalle solo di Nigeria e Angola. Isaias ne è assolutamente consapevole, ed è inoltre cosciente del fatto che il suo paese attualmente attraversa un grave stato di emergenza energetica. I tagli alle forniture elettriche in tutto il territorio eritreo, infatti, rimangono al momento molto frequenti, although the autumn of 2006 (just to coincide with the signing of agreements between the Eastern Front in Asmara and the Government of Sudan, chaired by Al-Bashir), they do not seem to extend to more capital.

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Militarized Diplomacy: foreign policy ERITREA between continuity and discontinuity (Part II)

Asmara: identity, independence and conflicts of a state "developed"

Eritrean identity emerged mainly as opposed to reality just before the Ethiopian imperial fascist invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. According to historians, it was the product of three main factors. First, growth of an ideology of discrimination directed against the Ethiopian people subject during the Italian colonization, compared to the Eritrean people considered to be under the protective umbrella of the "civilizing". Second, the economic boom that was recorded in Italian Eritrea immediately before the invasion of Ethiopia. And third, the role of Eritrean troops Fascist invasion of Ethiopia (it is estimated that about 50,000 units of the Italian army were then made by Ascari). These three features contributed to the birth of a first "boundary" between the Italian colony and Addis Ababa, contributing considerably to the formation of Eritrea and the myth of the country as the most developed area of \u200b\u200bthe empire, a conviction rooted in this part even in the rhetoric of the liberation war.

After the Italian defeat in World War II, Eritrea was temporarily placed under British trusteeship, before the UN decided to federate to Ethiopia in 1952. Its complete annexation by Haile Selassie as the fourteenth province of the empire in 1962 unleashed the first armed resistance in the area. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) began guerrilla actions in 1961, but in 1970 a small faction of the group is separated from the original line, then taking the name - in 1975 - the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The tension tra l’ELF e l’EPLF si concluse solo nel 1982, quando l’ELF fu sconfitto dall’EPLF, che rimase così l’unico movimento di contrapposizione al regime di Menghistu, che nel frattempo aveva destituito tramite un colpo di stato militare l’imperatore Haile Selassie. L’Eritrean People’s Liberation Front riuscì, infine – anche grazie all’aiuto indiretto di altri gruppi di opposizione alla giunta militare etiopica, come il Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) e l’Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) – a liberare la città di Asmara, e così l’Eritrea, il 24 maggio 1991. Dopo la caduta del Dergue nel giugno del 1991, la coalizione che aveva contribuito alla sua sconfitta, l’Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), prese il potere in Etiopia, dichiarando un periodo di transizione di due anni prima di indire un referendum sull’indipendenza eritrea. Nell’aprile del 1993 gli eritrei si espressero in favore dell’indipendenza, e così nel maggio dello stesso anno l’EPLF dichiarò il paese come uno Stato indipendente, il quale nasceva dai medesimi confini ereditati dall’ex colonia italiana. La configurazione dell’Eritrea nello scacchiere internazionale e regionale ha evidenziato come i suoi confini siano stati discussi e modellati nel tempo da forze prettamente “esterne”. Il paese pertanto può essere descritto come una classica "Borderland", a territorial entity always placed in open conflict with its important neighbors such as the state of Ethiopia, the Sudan and the Arab overlooking the Red Sea.

The ideological basis for the political development of post-Eritrean war of liberation were then transcribed in the National Charter for Eritrea, adopted by the Third Congress dell'EPLF / PFDJ in February 1994.

It was during this congress, the Front decided to change its name to People Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), with the intent to emphasize the conclusion of the liberation war and the transition from one wing of the administration militare ad una civile.

Una delle prime misure prese dal PFDJ per rafforzare il senso di appartenenza nazionale fu proprio quella di imbastire una leva militare obbligatoria per tutti gli uomini e donne che avessero raggiunto almeno un’età di diciotto anni. Unendo così in un unico esercito giovani Kunama, Afar, Beni Amer e Tigrini, il nuovo governo cercava di accrescere e cementificare lo stesso spirito nazionalista sperimentato durante gli anni di lotta di liberazione.

Quando l’Eritrea raggiunse l’indipendenza formale nel 1993, il proprio confine con l’Etiopia era ancora fissato da una serie di trattati coloniali italo-etiopici (segnati nel 1900, 1902 e 1908). Nonostante questo, the border was never fully demarcated, causing many problems to the usufruct of land and disputes in a number of administrative villages. On May 6, 1998, a small group of Eritrean soldiers entered the disputed area near the village of Badme, which still was under Ethiopian administration since 1962. The small and limited in comparison to the fire that ensued caused the escalation of the tension the more extensive, which led to the outbreak of a genuine cross-border war. Following the bombing on the Ethiopian city of Massawa, Asmara and Assab, the country accepted a peace document drawn up by the then Organization of African Unity (OAU). So, in August 1999 both parties to the conflict agreed in principle to the mediation of the OAU, which led - after a massive Ethiopian offensive in May 2000 - Algiers Agreement, signed June 18, 2000. The agreement provided for the establishment of a buffer zone along the Eritrean-Ethiopian border about 25 miles wide and called Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). The entire security strip was located entirely in Eritrean territory and led to the origin some 4,000 UN peacekeepers, members of the UNMEE (United Nations Mission for Eritrea and Ethiopia).

The Algiers Treaty was finally ratified by the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and President Eritrea Isaias Afwerki in December 2000. In addition, approval of the plan of peace inaugurated two committees, which would have to first register and regulate the claims of the two contenders (EECMA - Eritrea and Ethiopia Claim Commission) and the other to ensure the implementation of the demarcation of the border ( EEBC - Eritrea and Ethiopia Boundary Commission). The Boundary Commission, according to its founding treaty, had the task of providing a demarcation on the basis of several colonial treaties (treaties between Italy and Ethiopia in 1900, 1902 and 1908). The court therefore had no powers to impose such decisions on the matter ex aequo et bono. In particular, its membri erano privi della facoltà di esprimere giudizi basati su principi di equità ma, al contrario, le proprie funzioni dovevano esclusivamente attenersi ai testi dei trattati istituiti in epoca coloniale. La decisione della commissione si concretizzò quindi nel marzo del 2003, sancendo – di fatto – il diritto di appartenenza eritrea sul villaggio di Badme. Il rifiuto etiopico della decisione dell’EEBC determinò, però, uno stallo nelle trattative sul confine, di cui ancora oggi non se ne riesce a vedere una soluzione.

La nuova escalation di tensione legata al contenzioso sul confine è stata inoltre accompagnata – tra il maggio 2005 ed il luglio del 2006 – dall’espulsione dei European peacekeepers, American and Russian Eritrea and a significant reduction in the quota UNMEE, which now has about 2,500 men (of which 230 observers), as defined by Resolution 1681 of 31 May 2006. Despite numerous reminders of the UN Security Council to the spirit of Algiers - also accompanied by real threats of sanctions - both parties still refuse to sit at the negotiating table again, sacrificing diplomatic action in favor of a new - but not unprecedented - "relocation" of the conflict. This trend was also witnessed the entry of the two countries in the intricate crises in Somalia, which saw the alignment of at least two distinct fronts, who now believe that opposing the one hand the Transitional Federal Institutions based in Baidoa and Mogadishu - politically and militarily supported and protected by the Zenawi government - the Alliance and other for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS), born in September 2007 in Asmara under the protective umbrella of the government Afwerki.
The Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS) is a movement of opposition to the Transitional Federal Government was born in September 2007 in Asmara. It includes some 400 delegates, including the former chairman of the Shura Islamic Courts Union Hassan Dahir Aweys, the former Chairman of the Executive Board of the Courts Sharif Sheikh Ahmad, the former president of the transitional parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden and the former deputy prime minister of the Transitional Federal Government Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid.

Currently, Eritrea is ruled by a one-party system (People Front for Democracy and Justice - PFDJ), where there is no political opposition and where the field of information is held firmly in the hands of the executive through the Ministry of Information. The economy and its productive forces have been fully nationalized. The country therefore - also in accordance with the view of many analysts - is in many ways a classic example of "developmental state". In fact, its current system of governance has two main features: an ideological and a more structural. The structural component is the fact that political power bases its legitimacy primarily in its ability to promote and support development from within, minimizing the flow of international aid (which also explains the difficulty of non-governmental organizations to work and promote projects development in the country). On the ideological level, however, the ruling elite must be able at any time to impose "ideological hegemony" on society. In other words, the year that marked the work of the Asmara government seem to be largely the result of a process of state-building managed distinctly "top down" political elite in power. It also does nothing but present significantly in contrast with the spirit of the years of liberation struggle and then experienced the kind of accountability, the fact of inclusion and grassroots participation, particularly among the rural population of the plateau.

How To Make A Bicycle Cake

Militarized Diplomacy: foreign policy ERITREA between continuity and discontinuity (Part I) Eritrea

This article il frutto delle riflessioni e degli interventi scaturiti da una conferenza organizzata dal centro di ricerca di politica internazionale Chatham House di Londra il 17 dicembre 2007 e dal titolo “Eritrea’s Regional Role and Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future Perspectives"

LIMES, RIVISTA ITALIANA DI GEOPOLITICA

di Matteo Guglielmo
pubblicato il 26/2/2008 su http://www.limesonline.com

I rapporti politici tra Etiopia ed Eritrea sembrano essere nuovamente degenerati. I venti di guerra si avvicinano, mentre si respira la medesima atmosfera che precedette the last confrontation of the war 1998-2000. Major international research centers such as the International Crisis Group and the Chatham House, agree the situation to an end. The political motivations of this new escalation which could threaten to drag other countries in the Horn of Africa, Somalia in the head.

"The history of the regional borders of Eritrea does not go back more than a hundred years. All Eritreans are born equal. No ethnic group is superior or inferior to others. Eritrea belongs equally to every Eritrean. The new government therefore will fight forever against any divisive forces to create regional and religious conflicts in the country. "
Extract from speech of President Isaias Afwerki during the inauguration of the new regional administrative divisions of the country (Zoba) in 1995.

A Smara, August 20 2007. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki is preparing to release a long and full interview on national television ERITV concerning the state of relations with Washington. For two years now, in fact,
ties with the United States appear to be significantly impaired. The Isaias positions in foreign policy - sometimes unscrupulous - have often left stunned not only most of Western diplomacy, but the same U.S. administration, which - through its special envoy Jendayi Frazer - has just occurred on the role of Eritrea in the Somali crisis, defining "dangerous terrorists" some members of the deposed Islamic Courts in Mogadishu that is now in Asmara, and so accusing Eritrea of \u200b\u200bsupporting and supporting international terrorism in the Horn of Africa.

the allegations of the Secretary of the State Department in recent months has promptly responded to the Eritrean Information Minister Ali Abdu, who now described as "unjustified" action by the Frazer, emphasizing not only the commitment of country against the international terrorism of Islamic origin, but fighting back to the words of the Secretary determine the position of Washington "arrogant and time to carry out a political pressure on the Eritrean government". Although diplomacy remains largely a matter of Asmara to read, especially in the short term, the exchange of words between Eritrea and the Bush administration stresses the important role that the country currently holds the balance of power in the Horn , also reveals a certain impatience with the base "discriminatory" project of regional balance etiopicostatunitense. This, indeed, in the words of the president himself Afwerki, sarebbe diretto più che altro alla subordinazione delle numerose “periferie” della regione; dalla Somalia all’Ogaden, dall’Eritrea al Darfur.

L’Eritrea ha certamente dimostrato un ottimo grado d’institution-building a seguito della sua vittoria militare per l’indipendenza, contro un’Etiopia dapprima appoggiata dagli Stati Uniti (1953-1977), e successivamente sostenuta – durante buona parte del periodo di governo del Dergue – dall’Unione Sovietica (1977-1991). Il paese, negli ultimi quindici anni, è riuscito a legittimare il proprio status di nuovo attore della comunità internazionale a seguito di un referendum vinto dalle forze indipendentiste con quasi il 98,5% dei voti, e dove si espressero il 99,8% degli aventi diritto. La leadership politica, che dopo il 1993 ha guidato il paese attraverso la transizione delle istituzioni da movimento di guerriglia ad amministrazione di stampo civile, si è presentata però profondamente divisa, soprattutto in merito al modello di governance da adottare. In seguito, infatti, prevalse all’interno dell’esecutivo una linea politica certamente più pragmatica, ma drammaticamente antidemocratica, principalmente a causa dei numerosi contenziosi legati ai confini che hanno visto l’Eritrea contrapporsi ai suoi importanti vicini per buona parte della seconda metà degli anni Novanta, fino allo scoppio della guerra di frontiera with Ethiopia in 1998. This conflict, in particular, seems to have dragged the country into a vortex of military mobilization and political repression unprecedented, who ended up seriously compromising the prospects for democratization. The situation has further deteriorated in 2006, with the increase in custodial measures against a number of political dissidents, accompanied by strong restrictions on NGOs and international aid agencies in the area. Eritrea's independence, achieved after nearly three decades of guerrilla warfare, carried out first and then dall'Eritrean dall'Eritrean Liberation Front People's Liberation Front (EPLF), led to a strong concentration of political power, now held firmly in the hands of leadership of the former military commander - and current president - Isaias Afwerki. The constitution, ratified in 1997 has not yet been implemented, and elections have been postponed indefinitely. The

Eritrea lives in a perpetual state of emergency, and the constant state of tension with Ethiopia not only dominates all political discourse, but seems to serve the scheme as a means of mobilization and militarization inside.